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Abstract Adverse selection regarding a voluntary
deductible (VD) in health insurance implies that insured
only opt for a VD if they expect no (or few) healthcare
expenses. This paper investigates two potential strategies to
reduce adverse selection: (1) differentiating the premium to
the duration of the contract for which the VD holds (ex-
ante approach) and (2) differentiating the premium to the
number of years for which insured have opted for a VD
(ex-post approach). It can be hypothesized that premiums
will decrease with the duration of the contract or the
number of years for which insured have opted for a VD,
providing an incentive to insured to opt for a deductible
also in (incidental) years they expect relatively high
expenses. To test this hypothesis, we examine which pre-
mium patterns would occur under these strategies using
data on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics of over
750,000 insured from 6 years. Our results show that, under
the assumptions made, only without risk equalization the
premiums could decrease with the duration of the contract
or the number of years for which insured have opted for a
VD. With (sophisticated) risk equalization, decreasing
premiums seem unfeasible, both under the ex-ante and ex-
post approach. Given these findings, we are sceptical about
the feasibility of these strategies to counteract adverse
selection.
Keywords Adverse selection  Health insurance  Moral
hazard  Premium  Voluntary deductibles
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Introduction
In several regulated health insurance markets, such as
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the US,
insured are offered the possibility to opt for a voluntary
deductible in return for a premium rebate. These deduc-
tibles may counteract moral hazard [10, 43], which is a
well-known consequence of (comprehensive) health
insurance and refers to the change in health behavior and
healthcare consumption caused by the fact that the insurer
reimburses (part of) the costs. Economic theory predicts
that rational consumer behavior causes individuals to opt
for a voluntary deductible only if the expected expenses
under the deductible fall below the premium rebate. This
phenomenon is referred to as adverse selection and implies
that low-risk individuals are more inclined to opt for a
voluntary deductible than high-risk individuals within the
same premium-risk group [1, 7, 9, 24, 25]. Such behavior
would also imply that insured do not opt for a deductible in
a (incidental) year they expect (high) expenses. This may
limit the moral hazard reduction resulting from the
deductible.
In free markets, insurers can reduce adverse selection by
risk-rating the premium or by denying insured to reduce the
deductible level (or metal tier) in later years. Furthermore,
insurers in either free or regulated markets can reduce
adverse selection by an ex-ante or ex-post differentiation of
the premium according to, respectively, the duration of the
contract for which the voluntary deductible holds or the
& K. P. M. van Winssen
vanwinssen@bmg.eur.nl
1 Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus
University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50,
3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands
123
Eur J Health Econ
DOI 10.1007/s10198-016-0767-4
number of previous years for which insured have opted for
a voluntary deductible.1 It is hypothesized that the longer
the period for which the voluntary deductible holds or the
more previous years insured have opted for a voluntary
deductible, the lower the premium can be. This could
incentivize insured to opt for a voluntary deductible for a
longer period or more consecutive years, implying a larger
moral hazard reduction since insured then also opt for a
voluntary deductible in (incidental) years they expect high
expenses. Related to the ex-ante differentiation, the Ger-
man law states that the deductible holds for at least 3 years.
Related to the ex-post differentiation, the Dutch law offers
insurers the possibility to differentiate the premium rebate
to the number of years insured have opted for a voluntary
deductible.
This paper explores the premium patterns in case of
either an ex-ante or ex-post differentiation of the premium.
Our central research question reads: What would the
premiums look like when differentiated to either the
duration of the contract for which the voluntary deductible
holds (i.e., the ex-ante approach) or the number of previous
consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary
deductible (i.e., the ex-post approach)? These premiums
depend upon the predicted expenses of insured choosing
the different deductible options. However, for which
deductible option insured choose depends on their pre-
dicted expenses and the premium. Our variable of interest,
the premium, therefore is an endogenous variable. Conse-
quently, we have to simulate the distribution of insured
across the deductible options and subsequently determine
the corresponding premiums. To achieve this, we use data
on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics of 762,982
insured from 6 years.
The ‘‘Theoretical background’’ discusses the moral
hazard reduction resulting from deductibles, how to coun-
teract adverse selection in regulated markets, the compo-
sition of the premium and the effect of risk equalization on
the premium. The data and methods are explained in
‘‘Data’’ and ‘‘Methods’’. Subsequently, the results, conclu-
sions and discussion are presented in, respectively, ‘‘Re-
sults’’, ‘‘Conclusions’’ and ‘‘Discussion’’.
Theoretical background
Moral hazard and deductibles
Moral hazard is a well-known consequence of compre-
hensive health insurance, such as in Germany, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, and the US. It refers to the change in
health behavior and healthcare consumption resulting from
the reimbursement of the costs for healthcare services by
the insurer. It could be counteracted by cost-sharing
arrangements. Many have studied the effect of different
cost-sharing arrangements on the moral hazard reduction
[7, 10, 12, 13, 30, 44]. This paper focuses on the voluntary
deductible as an instrument to reduce moral hazard. Gerfin
et al. [13] show that due to high voluntary deductibles,
healthcare demand in Switzerland dropped by 27 %.
Additionally, Trottmann et al. [30] correct for the selection
effect that results from the voluntary deductible and show
that high voluntary deductibles in Switzerland reduced
healthcare expenses by 23 %. These studies thus show that
deductibles could indeed be an effective instrument to
counteract moral hazard.
Counteracting adverse selection in regulated health
insurance markets
Rational economic behavior predicts that individuals will
only opt for a voluntary deductible if their expected out-of-
pocket expenses under the deductible are smaller than the
offered premium rebate. This could lead to adverse selec-
tion, meaning that low-risk individuals are more inclined to
opt for a voluntary deductible than high-risk individuals
within the same premium-risk group [1, 24, 25]. Eventu-
ally, this could result in an adverse selection (or death)
spiral. Several studies indicate that the key conditions for
adverse selection—the ability to forecast risk and the fact
that this forecast affects insurance takeout [6, 27, 40]—
exist [19, 21, 22]. Insurers in free markets can reduce
adverse selection by risk-rating the premium or by denying
insured to reduce their deductible level in later years.
However, insurers in regulated health insurance markets,
such as in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the
US, do not have these options. In these markets, both the
premium and the premium rebate for voluntary deductibles
must be community-rated, meaning that insurers must offer
the same premium (rebate) to each insured with the same
insurance policy and the same deductible level.2 Addi-
tionally, the above-mentioned countries have open
1 Zweifel [42] has studied the effect of bonuses (instead of
deductibles used as a sanction method) in West Germany comparing
three insurers. He shows that a no-claim bonus and an experience-
rated bonus even more, dampens the demand for ambulatory care.
The experience-rated bonus implies that insured received a bonus of
two monthly premiums in the first year with no claims, three monthly
premiums in the second year, and four monthly premiums in the third
consecutive year with no claims. Note, however, that with an ex-post
differentiation, the premium is only differentiated to the number of
previous consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary
deductible. The amount of claims is of no importance to the premium
in the next year the insured opts for a voluntary deductible.
2 Only in the Health Insurance Marketplaces in the US (formerly
known as the Health Insurance Exchanges) premiums may be
conditioned on age (1:3), smoking (1:1.5), family size and geography,
but not on other risk characteristics.
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enrolment, which means that applicants cannot be rejected.
Therefore, insured can determine each year whether to opt
for a voluntary deductible.3 The requirements of both
community-rating and open enrolment cause adverse
selection to be larger in regulated markets than in free
markets, which limits the moral hazard reduction resulting
from voluntary deductibles. Insurers in regulated markets
may have two options to reduce adverse selection.4 The
first option regards an ex-ante differentiation of the pre-
mium to the duration of the contract for which the volun-
tary deductible holds (e.g., 1, 5, 10 years, etc.). The second
option regards an ex-post differentiation of the premium to
the number of previous consecutive years insured have
opted for a voluntary deductible. Note that with this option,
compared to the ex-ante option, insured have the possibility
to adjust (or even opt out of) the deductible level each year.
Assuming that insured who opt for a voluntary deductible
for a longer contract period or in multiple consecutive
years are healthier than insured who only opt for a vol-
untary deductible in 1 year, it can be hypothesized that the
premium would, ceteris paribus, decrease with the contract
period for which the deductible holds or the number of
previous consecutive years insured have opted for a vol-
untary deductible. In Germany, the law states that volun-
tary deductibles hold for 3 years, which is related to the ex-
ante differentiation as discussed within this paper, except
that German insured have no choice regarding the contract
period (i.e., insured either choose no deductible or a
deductible that holds for 3 years). The Dutch law provides
insurers the possibility to apply an ex-post differentiation
of the premium as discussed within this paper, stating that
‘‘the premium rebate may depend on the number of cal-
endar years for which the insured has opted for a voluntary
deductible’’.5 It was mentioned that insured had to weigh
the increase in premium rebate against the possibility to
decrease the voluntary deductible [15] and that this would
provide insured with an incentive to opt for a deductible
also in a year they incidentally expect (high) healthcare
expenses. After a decade, however, none of the Dutch
insurers utilizes the option.
Composition of the premium
To determine the ex-ante and ex-post differentiated
premiums, this section discusses the composition of the
premium. Generally speaking, the premium paid by insured
equals the expected insurance claims6 (see Fig. 1). Insured
with a voluntary deductible receive a premium rebate that
can be decomposed into three components [33]. The first
component is the effect of self-selection that arises
because, given a certain premium rebate, healthy insured
have a greater incentive to opt for a voluntary deductible
than unhealthy insured (i.e., the adverse selection compo-
nent). Consequently, market segmentation is created where
insured with a voluntary deductible are on average
healthier and have lower insurance claims than insured
without a voluntary deductible. The second component is
the moral hazard reduction resulting from the voluntary
deductible, which (ceteris paribus) lowers the total
healthcare expenses. The third component regards the
expected out-of-pocket expenses paid by insured with a
voluntary deductible. Consequently, the insurer has to
reimburse less than for insured without a voluntary
deductible (ceteris paribus).
Many studies show that mostly young and healthy
insured opt for a voluntary deductible (e.g., [8, 11, 20,
31, 41]). Given these findings, it is expected that insured
who opt for a voluntary deductible with a long contract
period or in more consecutive years are healthier than
insured with short contract periods and few years. Sub-
sequently, the expected insurance claims, moral hazard
reduction, and out-of-pocket expenses of insured with a
voluntary deductible for a long contract period or in
more consecutive years could be smaller than for insured
with short contract periods or few years. So, if the
premium is either ex-ante or ex-post differentiated, one
possible outcome could be that the premium decreases
with respectively the contract period or the number of
years insured have opted for a voluntary deductible.
However, insured with long contract periods could incur
(unexpected) high healthcare expenses during the con-
tract. As a result, the differentiation could also result in
an increasing premium with the contract period. Fur-
thermore, if the ex-post differentiation indeed results in a
behavioral effect (i.e., insured keep the deductible also
in years they expect high healthcare expenses), the
premium could also increase with the number of years
insured have opted for a deductible.
3 Note that the voluntary deductible in Germany holds for 3 years
and insured can only adjust their voluntary deductible after these
3 years.
4 Note that due to the requirements of community-rating and open
enrolment, insurers in regulated markets are, compared to insurers in
free markets, unable to risk-rate the premium (rebate) or to deny
insured to reduce the deductible level to counteract adverse selection.
5 In the corresponding amendment, this was originally formulated as:
‘‘the premium rebate may depend on the duration of the health
insurance policy’’ [15], which is actually an ex-ante differentiation of
the premium rebate.
6 In this paper, we solely focus on the insurance claims and disregard
the insurers’ loading fee (e.g., overhead costs and administration
costs), since in our data (‘‘Data’’) we have no information on the
loading fee and since the loading fee only constitutes a small part of
the premium.
A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it, the lower your…
123
Effect of risk equalization on the premium
In addition to the requirements of community-rating (i.e.,
insurers must offer the same premium to each insured
with the same policy and the same deductible level) and
open enrolment (i.e., applicants cannot be rejected),
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the US have
a risk equalization scheme that compensates insurers for
differences in predicted expenses between low-risk and
high-risk individuals. The current German risk equaliza-
tion scheme includes demographic risk adjusters and a set
of morbidity-based risk adjusters [4]. The Swiss risk
equalization scheme includes age, gender, and prior hos-
pitalization as risk adjusters [28]. The Dutch scheme in-
cludes an age and gender interaction, Pharmacy-based
Cost Groups (PCGs), Diagnoses-based Cost Groups
(DCGs), durable medical equipment cost groups, source
of income, region, social economic status, multiple-year
high costs and generic somatic morbidity [16]. In 2014,
the Health Insurance Marketplaces in all states in Amer-
ica (except Massachusetts) use the risk equalization model
developed by the US Department of Health and Human
Services based upon the Hierarchical Condition Cate-
gories [17]. These risk equalization systems affect the
premium paid by insured. Let us assume that risk equal-
ization perfectly adjusts for the differences in predicted
expenses between low-risk and high-risk individuals. In
that case, the premium consists of the expected insurance
claims and a risk equalization payment. Firstly, for
insured without a voluntary deductible, this risk equal-
ization payment is equal to the difference between the
average healthcare expenses in the population and the
individuals’ average predicted insurance claims. This
implies that risk equalization has a negative effect on the
premium if the individual expenses are larger than the
average expenses, and a positive effect on the premium if
the individual expenses are smaller than the average
expenses. Secondly, the risk equalization payment for
insured with a voluntary deductible equals the difference
between the average healthcare expenses in the population
and the sum of the predicted expenses, the moral hazard
reduction, and the out-of-pocket expenses resulting from
the voluntary deductible. After all, risk equalization aims
to equalize the adverse selection component. In case of
perfect risk equalization, this adverse selection component
is fully equalized and incorporated into the premium.
Therefore, the premium rebate only consists of the moral
hazard reduction and out-of-pocket expenses. However, if
risk equalization does not perfectly adjust for differences
in predicted expenses between low-risk and high-risk
individuals, a share of the adverse selection component is
not equalized and therefore reflected into the premium
rebate. The difference in quality between the Swiss and
the Dutch risk equalization schemes might also (partially)
explain why in Switzerland 56 % of the insured opted for
a voluntary deductible in 2013 [5], while in the Nether-
lands only 12 % opted for a voluntary deductible in 2015
[39]. After all, Swiss insurers might be able to reflect a
larger share of the adverse selection component into the
premium rebate.
Fig. 1 Composition of the
premium and premium rebate in
health insurance markets
without risk equalization
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Conclusion
In sum, voluntary deductibles are offered in the regulated
health insurance markets of Germany, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, and the US in order to counteract moral
hazard. However, the moral hazard reduction is limited due
to adverse selection, where insured only opt for a voluntary
deductible if their expected expenses are smaller than the
premium rebate. In these regulated markets, adverse
selection could potentially be reduced by an ex-ante or ex-
post differentiation of the premium to respectively the
contract period for which the voluntary deductible holds or
the number of previous consecutive years an insured has
opted for a voluntary deductible. To determine the differ-
entiated premiums that could then be offered, we perform
several empirical simulations in which we also include the
effect of risk equalization on the premium.
Data
For the empirical analyses, we use the Achmea Health
Database that contains administrative data from a large
Dutch health insurer who operates mainly in the western
and eastern parts of the Netherlands. It includes individual-
level information on insurance claims in the years
2006–2011 aggregated at and categorized into the follow-
ing 11 types of healthcare services: GP-care, pharmacy,
inpatient care, hospital admissions, outpatient care, dental
care, maternity care, durable medical equipment, physio-
therapy, mental healthcare, and care consumed in a foreign
country. Moreover, the database includes an encrypted ID
number and (per-year) information on the year of birth,
sex, ethnicity, degree of urbanization, the number of days
of enrolment, and in which PCG and/or DCG the insured is
classified for the risk equalization scheme. Remember that
PCGs and DCGs are risk adjusters used as a proxy for
health status, based upon prior use of pharmaceuticals and
prior hospital inpatient diagnoses, respectively [37]. For
simplicity reasons, two selection criteria are applied to our
simulation sample: individuals must be fully insured in all
6 years7 and individuals must be 18 years or older on
January 1, 2007, since in the Netherlands only adults can
opt for a voluntary deductible. These selection criteria
provide us with a sample of 762,982 insured. In order to be
able to compare the premium of both the ex-ante and ex-
post differentiation and since the deductible amount
remains the same for all years (see ‘‘Composition of the
premium’’), all healthcare expenses are corrected for
inflation to the level of 2007. When comparing our sample
with the Dutch population, it shows that the average health
in the dataset is somewhat worse compared to the Dutch
population: e.g., more insured are classified into a PCG or
DCG and the average healthcare expenses are higher. This
is probably caused by the fact that the Achmea Health
Database belongs to a former sickness fund. Since we
select insured opting for a voluntary deductible relative to
the entire sample, the difference between our sample and
the Dutch population could affect the absolute level of the
premium but would not affect the premium patterns over
the deductible options.
Methods
Opting for a voluntary deductible
In order to determine the premiums in year t, we need to
know which insured opt for which deductible option. In
other words, for the ex-ante differentiation, we need to
know for year t which group of insured did not opt for a
voluntary deductible and which groups of insured opted for
a voluntary deductible with either a 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, or 5-year
contract period. For the ex-post differentiation, we need to
know for year t which group of insured did not opt for a
voluntary deductible, which group opted for a voluntary
deductible in year t, but not in year t - 1, which group
opted for a voluntary deductible in year t and t - 1, but not
in year t - 2, etc.
Following the theory of rational consumer behavior, the
distributions of insured over the deductible options would
ideally be determined by comparing the insured’s expected
benefits with his/her expected costs of opting for a
7 In our dataset, few insured (0.9 %) opted for a voluntary deductible
in 2011. Note that it is impossible to perform the empirical analyses
with the insured who actually opted for a voluntary deductible since
we only have data from one Dutch insurer. This means that we cannot
follow insured who switch insurers. Research shows that especially
young and healthy insured switch insurers [14, 23, 26]. These are also
the insured who are most likely to opt for a voluntary deductible (e.g.,
[8, 11, 20, 31, 41]). Consequently, our results could become biased if
we would perform the analyses with the insured who actually opted
for a voluntary deductible in the dataset. To overcome this problem,
we perform a simulation study. Prior to the simulation, we have
corrected the healthcare expenses of the insured in the dataset who
Footnote 7 continued
opted for a voluntary deductible in any year. For each of these insured
in each of the years for the five different Dutch voluntary deductible
levels (i.e., €100, €200, €300, €400, or €500), we increased their
healthcare expenses with a percentage based upon extensive research
by Keeler et al. [18] (see also [2, 3]), to correct for the moral hazard
reduction that results from the voluntary deductible. Note that in this
case we apply the results of the study by Keeler et al. [18] since this
enables us to apply different percentages for different deductible
levels in different years. For the moral hazard reduction in the rest of
the paper, we apply the results by Trottmann et al. [30] since these
results are more recent.
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voluntary deductible, implying that only insured for whom
their expected healthcare expenses under the deductible are
smaller than the premium rebate would opt for a voluntary
deductible. However, whether insured opt for a voluntary
deductible in a certain year depends on the premium, but at
the same time the premium depends on the distribution of
insured over the deductible options. This makes the pre-
mium, which is also our variable of interest, an endogenous
variable. This means that we cannot use the premium as the
input variable to determine who opts for a deductible.
Therefore, to get an estimate of these premiums, we make
assumptions about the distribution of insured over the
deductible options for both the ex-ante and ex-post dif-
ferentiation. We assume that insured with the lowest pre-
dicted healthcare expenses would opt for a deductible.
Several models, which can be found in ‘‘Appendix 1’’, to
determine the rank of insured based upon their predicted
healthcare expenses in year t have been tested. The most
accurate model, based upon the Spearman’s correlation
coefficient, is an OLS model with a log transformation of
healthcare expenses and we use this model for our empir-
ical simulations. The dependent variable regards the total
healthcare expenses under basic insurance in year t. The
independent variables indicate several background char-
acteristics that are in the dataset: an age and gender
interaction, classification into a PCG and/or DCG in year
t (based upon information from year t - 1), degree of
urbanization in the residential area, ethnicity and past total
healthcare expenses in year t - 1 classified into vigintiles.
A detailed description of the independent variables can be
found in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. After the healthcare expenses are
predicted, insured are ranked accordingly. Furthermore, we
determine the rank of insured in years t - 1, t - 2, t - 3,
and t - 4 based upon their predicted healthcare expenses
in those years. In order to do so, we use the same model
specification as for year t, but the variables are based upon
data from earlier years.8 Note that for the ex-ante differ-
entiation, insured have to decide on the duration of their
contract period in year t (i.e., 2007) and that we use
information from the years t ? 1, t ? 2, t ? 3 and t ? 4
(i.e., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) to determine the rank of
insured in these years. However, one might question
whether insured in year t have (all) information concerning
the upcoming years. An alternative approach would be to
use only the information from year t and t - 1 to determine
the rank of insured in future years. With the first approach,
we would overestimate adverse selection, while with the
second approach we would underestimate adverse selection
into multiple-year contracts. After all, research shows that
substantial consumer information surplus exists also for
multiple-year contracts [32], meaning that insured do have
some information regarding their future healthcare expen-
ses that may not be picked up by administrative informa-
tion from year t - 1. Therefore, and for reasons of
simplicity, we determine the rank of insured for all years
using the first mentioned approach for both the ex-ante and
ex-post differentiation. In ‘‘Appendix 3’’ we will show that
the possible overestimation of adverse selection under this
approach has no impact on the main conclusions of this
paper.
The ex-ante differentiation
For the ex-ante differentiation, we simulate a distribution of
insured over the different contract periods. We assume that
an insurer wants to determine the premiums in year t (i.e.,
2007 for the ex-ante differentiation) in case he would offer
six different insurance policies: a policy without a voluntary
deductible and five policies with different contract periods
for the voluntary deductible, i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 years.
Remember that for all years we have ranked insured
according to their predicted expenses in that year. We
assume that the half of the sample with the lowest predicted
expenses in year t opts for an insurance policy with a
deductible. To then determine who will opt for which multi-
year contract, we sum the rank of the insured over the dif-
ferent contract periods. In other words, for a 2-year contract,
we sum the rank of insured in year t and t ? 1, and for a
3-year contract, we sum the rank of insured in year t, t ? 1
and t ? 2, etc. From the half of the sample that is assumed to
opt for a policy with a deductible, the quintile with the lowest
sum-rank for a 5-year contract is assumed to opt for that
policy. From the remaining 40 % of insured opting for a
deductible, the quarter with the lowest sum-rank for a 4-year
contract is assumed to opt for that policy. From the remaining
30 % of insured opting for a deductible, the third with the
lowest sum-rank for a 3-year contract is assumed to opt for
that policy. From the remaining 20 % of insured opting for a
deductible, the half of insured with the lowest sum-rank for a
2-year contract is assumed to opt for that policy and the other
half is assumed to opt for a 1-year contract with a deductible.
Note that this process does not include the simulation of a
behavioral effect where insured would also opt for a long
contract period even if they incidentally expect high
healthcare expenses in 1 year during the contract period. In
the end, this process provides uswith a distribution of insured
in year twhere a group of 50 %of the insured does not opt for
a deductible and five groups of 10 % do opt for a deductible
with respectively a 1-, 2-, 3-, 4- or 5-year contract period. For
8 E.g., for the rank of the insured in year t - 1, this implies that the
dependent variable regards the total healthcare expenses under basic
insurance in year t - 1 and the independent variables regard an age
and gender interaction, classification into a PCG and/or DCG in year
t - 1 (based upon information from year t - 2), degree of urbaniza-
tion in the residential area, ethnicity, and past total healthcare
expenses in year t - 2 classified into vigintiles.
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this distribution of insured, we subsequently determine the
premiums per insurance policy.
The ex-post differentiation
For the ex-post differentiation, we simulate a distribution of
insured in year t (i.e., 2011 for the ex-post differentiation)
based upon the number of previous consecutive years insured
have opted for a voluntary deductible. For this differentia-
tion, we assume that an insurer decreases the premium with
each additional consecutive year an insured has opted for a
voluntary deductible since year t - 4 (i.e., 2007 for this
differentiation). Two scenarios are simulated depending on
the potential behavioral effect of this differentiation.
In scenario I, we assume that the differentiation of the
premium has no effect on the decision to opt for a volun-
tary deductible, which is contrary to what would be
expected (and was expected by the Dutch government).
Insured only opt for a deductible if they belong to the half
of the sample with the lowest predicted expenses. Looking
back from year t, we determine for insured who are
assumed to opt for a deductible in year t the number of
previous consecutive years they are assumed to opt for a
voluntary deductible as well.
In scenario II, we assume a moderate behavioral effect
of the differentiation of the premium. We assume that
insured are willing to keep the voluntary deductible for
1 year they expect (high) healthcare expenses (i.e., belong
to the half of the sample with the highest predicted
healthcare expenses). This means for instance that if an
insured is assumed to opt for a voluntary deductible in year
t - 4, he will also opt for a deductible in year t - 3,
irrespective of his rank in that year. The insured is there-
after assumed to opt out of the voluntary deductible in year
t - 2 only if he belongs to the half of the sample with the
highest predicted healthcare expenses in both year t - 3
and t - 2, etc. In the end, this process provides us with a
scenario where some retention of the voluntary deductible
results from the differentiation of the premium, but where
insured also opt out of the voluntary deductible if they for
instance incur a chronic disease. The simulation process for
these scenarios results in a distribution of insured in year
t over six groups: insured without a voluntary deductible,
insured with a voluntary deductible with different numbers
of previous consecutive years they have opted for deduc-
tible (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 previous consecutive years).
Composition of the premium
After the distribution of insured over the deductible options
for both the ex-ante and ex-post differentiation in year t are
simulated, we calculate the premium for each of the six
aforementioned groups per distribution. For the analyses,
we assume a voluntary deductible of €1000. The average
healthcare expenses per individual (HCE) in the dataset are
€18949 in all years. The premium is determined using
Eqs. (1a) and (1b) for respectively insured without and
with a voluntary deductible:
PNVD ¼ ICNVDþREPNVD ð1aÞ
PVD ¼ ICVDþREPVD ð1bÞ
where P is the premium, NVD indicates insured without a
voluntary deductible, VD indicates insured with a volun-
tary deductible (with either different contract periods or
different numbers of previous years they have opted for a
deductible), IC are the average insurance claims and REP
represents the average risk equalization payment. Without
any risk equalization, the equations show that the premium
equals the average insurance claims in the group. With risk
equalization, however, the premium is affected by the risk
equalization payment, which is determined for insured
without a voluntary deductible using Eq. (2a)10:
REPNVD ¼ x
100
HCE ICNVD
h i
ð2aÞ
where x indicates the quality of the risk equalization
model11 and HCE indicates the average healthcare expen-
ses in the data without any cost-sharing arrangements. Due
to the voluntary deductible, the risk equalization payment
for insured with a voluntary deductible is different to that
of insured without a voluntary deductible and determined
using Eq. (2b):
REPVD ¼ x
100
HCE ICVDþMHRVDþOOPVD
 h i
ð2bÞ
where MHR and OOP respectively indicate the average
moral hazard reduction and the average out-of-pocket
expenses for the group of insured with a voluntary
deductible (for different contract periods or in multiple
consecutive years) resulting from the deductible.12 After
9 The average healthcare expenses of €1894 in the data regard the
expenses without any cost sharing arrangements (i.e., the insurance
claims, out-of-pocket expenses and moral hazard reduction as shown
in Fig. 1). The average expenses are equal for all years due to the
correction for inflation to the year 2007.
10 Note that, compared to Eq. (2b), the moral hazard reduction and
out-of-pocket expenses in Eq. (2a) are omitted because insured
without a voluntary deductible do not have any moral hazard
reduction and out-of-pocket expenses resulting from a deductible.
11 x indicates the percentage in which risk equalization is able to
equalize the predicted differences in healthcare expenses between
low-risk and high-risk individuals caused by differences in health.
12 Note that in our simulations the moral hazard reduction and out-of-
pocket expenses are fully reflected in the premium rebate, while in
practice different countries make different choices.
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the risk equalization payment for the different groups of
insured is determined, the premiums can be calculated
using Eqs. (1a) or (1b) depending on whether the insured
has a deductible or not.
In order to determine the differentiated premiums that
can be offered by insurers, we need to know (1) the average
healthcare expenses in the data, (2) the average insurance
claims, the average moral hazard reduction and the average
out-of-pocket expenses for the different groups of insured,
and (3) the quality of the risk equalization model. Firstly,
the average healthcare expenses in the data are already
mentioned and equal €1894. Secondly, for the average
insurance claims for insured who are not assumed to opt for
a deductible, we use the healthcare expenses in the data.
Since no cost-sharing arrangements are in place in our data,
the healthcare expenses in the data for insured who are
assumed to opt for a deductible include a moral hazard
reduction and out-of-pocket expenses they would have in
case of a voluntary deductible. Many researchers have
studied the reduction of healthcare expenses resulting from
voluntary deductibles [e.g., 2, 3, 13, 18, 30]. For our
simulations, we use the reduction as determined in the
study by Trottmann et al. [30] since the researchers of this
recent study corrected for the selection effect that arises
when taking out voluntary deductibles. Consequently, the
healthcare expenses in the data of insured with a voluntary
deductible are reduced by 22.6 % due to the voluntary
deductible. The size of the out-of-pocket expenses is
determined as the healthcare expenses after the moral
hazard reduction in the interval [0:1000]. The insurance
claims for insured with a voluntary deductible are then
determined as the healthcare expenses in the data minus the
moral hazard reduction and minus the out-of-pocket
expenses. For instance, an insured with healthcare expenses
of ‘‘€1250 in the data’’ and a voluntary deductible of
€1000 will have a moral hazard reduction of €283
(€1250 9 0.226), out-of-pocket expenses of €967
(€1250 - €283) and no insurance claims
(€1250 - €283 - €967). However, if an insured who opts
for a voluntary deductible of €1000 has healthcare expen-
ses of ‘‘€2500 in the data’’, the moral hazard reduction will
be €566 (€2500 9 0.226), the out-of-pocket expenses will
be €1000 (€2500 - €566 = €1934) and the insurance
claims equal €934 (€2500 - €566 - €1000). Thirdly, to
determine the effect of risk equalization on the premium,
Van Kleef et al. [35] show that equalization based upon
region, age and gender, and equalization based upon
demographic factors, PCGs and DCGs respectively reduce
the adverse selection component of the premium rebate for
the highest Swiss voluntary deductibles with respectively
47 and 74 % in 2006. For our simulations, we therefore
study the effect of no risk equalization, perfect risk
equalization and the two models used in the research by
Van Kleef et al. [35]. Note that due to extensive research,
risk equalization schemes have become more sophisticated
and that the Dutch scheme of 2015 is already more
sophisticated than the 74 % model studied by Van Kleef
et al. [35].
Results
Situation without differentiation
Since different percentages of insured who are assumed to
opt for a voluntary deductible can be studied, Table 1
shows the results under the assumption that 5, 25, or 50 %
of the sample with the lowest predicted expenses would opt
for a voluntary deductible of €1000 without any differen-
tiation of the premium without any risk equalization. Three
insights are drawn from this table. Firstly, the table shows
that both the premiums and premium rebates increase with
the percentage of insured opting for a deductible. The latter
is partially due to the increase of the moral hazard reduc-
tion and out-of-pocket expenses, but largely due to the
increase in adverse selection. Secondly, in all three cases,
the premium rebate is larger than the voluntary deductible
itself.13 Thirdly, the premium rebate in general exists for
the largest part of an adverse selection component (i.e.,
88 % of the premium rebate if 50 % of the insured would
opt for a voluntary deductible).
The ex-ante differentiation
Remember that, for the ex-ante differentiation, we want to
determine the premiums in year t (i.e., 2007 for this dif-
ferentiation) in case an insurer would offer six insurance
policies: a policy without a voluntary deductible and five
policies with different contract periods for the voluntary
deductible. Table 2 shows the results of this simulation
without any risk equalization and provides three insights.
Firstly, the table shows that the premium could decrease
with the duration of the contract. Secondly, the premium
for insured with a 1-year contract for the deductible is
much higher compared to the situation without differenti-
ation. Thirdly, the table shows that the moral hazard
reduction for a 1-year contract and the out-of-pocket
expenses for both a 1- and 2-year contract are larger
compared to the situation without differentiation.
13 Note that the Swiss government has capped the offered premium
rebate at 70 % of the voluntary deductible level and that all Swiss
insurers offer this premium rebate. Due to a relatively poor risk
equalization scheme (and therefore a substantial adverse selection
component), it may be that if the Swiss government did not oblige this
cap, premium rebates would be much higher.
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The ex-post differentiation
Remember that for the ex-post differentiation, scenario I
simulated a situation without any behavioral effect. The
upper part of Table 3 shows the results for scenario I
without any risk equalization and provides three insights.
Firstly, the table shows that the premium could decrease
with the number of previous consecutive years insured
have opted for a deductible. Secondly, it shows that com-
pared to the situation without differentiation, the premium
is higher for the first three consecutive years. Thirdly, the
table shows that the moral hazard reduction and out-of-
pocket expenses are larger for the first four consecutive
years opting for a voluntary deductible compared to the
situation without differentiation.
In scenario II, insured are assumed to keep the voluntary
deductible during 1 year they expect (high) healthcare
expenses incentivized by the premium differentiation. The
bottom part of Table 3 shows the results for scenario II
without any risk equalization and provides three insights.
Firstly, the results show that the premium would increase
sharply for the second consecutive year compared to the
first year opting for a deductible and that the premium
would thereafter considerably decrease. This would imply
that only after the second consecutive year, offering a
decreasing premium with the number of years insured have
opted for a deductible would be feasible in case of no risk
equalization. The increase in premium for the second
consecutive year follows from the retention of the volun-
tary deductible in that year even if (high) healthcare
expenses are expected, meaning that insured who expect
(high) healthcare expenses for the second consecutive year
opting for a deductible are included in that group. Sec-
ondly, compared to a situation without differentiation, the
premium is only lower for the fifth consecutive year opting
for a voluntary deductible. Thirdly, the moral hazard
reduction and out-of-pocket expenses are larger for the first
four consecutive years opting for a deductible compared to
the situation without differentiation of the premium.
Compared to scenario I, the moral hazard reduction and
out-of-pocket expenses are larger for all groups, except for
the out-of-pocket expenses for insured with a voluntary
deductible for five consecutive years.
Risk equalization
Table 4 provides the estimated ex-ante differentiated
premiums in case of perfect risk equalization. It shows that,
as a result of perfect risk equalization, the premium is
expected to increase with the duration of the contract.
Furthermore, Table 4 shows that only insured with a 1-year
contract period for the deductible pay a lower premium
compared to the situation without differentiation of the
premium. Figure 2 additionally shows the premium pat-
terns for an ex-ante differentiation compared to a 1-year
contract for the voluntary deductible for risk equalization
models that equalize 0 %, 47 % (i.e., based upon region,
age, and gender), 74 % (i.e., based upon demographic
factors, PCGs and DCGs) or 100 % of the differences in
predicted expenses between low-risk and high-risk indi-
viduals. It shows that a decreasing premium with the
duration of the contract for which the deductible holds is
only feasible without any risk equalization.
Table 5 provides the estimated ex-post differentiated
premiums in case of perfect risk equalization. For scenario
I (i.e., without any behavioral effect), the table shows that
the premium is expected to increase with the number of
years insured have opted for a deductible. For scenario II
(i.e., with a moderate behavioral effect), the table shows
that the premium could decrease between the first and
second consecutive year insured have opted for a deduc-
tible, but that it would thereafter increase with the number
of consecutive years insured have opted for a voluntary
Table 1 Composition of the premium (P) in 2007 for an insurance
policy with a voluntary deductible of €1000 for different percentages
of insured with the lowest predicted healthcare expenses who are
assumed to opt for a voluntary deductible, without any differentiation
of the premium, without any risk equalization
% HCE ICa MHR OOP P
a
5 % opts for a voluntary deductible
95 NVD €1894 €1981 €1981
5 VD €46 €51 €129 €46
25 % opts for a voluntary deductible
75 NVD €1894 €2417 €2417
25 VD €75 €74 €176 €75
50 % opts for a voluntary deductible
50 NVD €1894 €3289 €3289
50 VD €128 €113 €257 €128
HCE, average healthcare expenses; IC, average insurance claims;
MHR, average moral hazard reduction; OOP, average out-of-pocket
expenses; P, premium; NVD, insured without a voluntary deductible;
VD, insured with a voluntary deductible
a Note that since a situation without risk equalization is shown, no
risk equalization payment is in place and the insurance claims equal
the premium
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deductible. In both scenarios, only insured who opt for a
voluntary deductible for the fifth consecutive year are
offered a higher premium compared to the situation
without differentiation of the premium. Figures 3 and 4
additionally show the premium patterns for an ex-post
differentiation for, respectively, scenario I and II compared
to 1 year opting for a voluntary deductible for risk equal-
ization models that equalize 0, 47, 74, or 100 % of the
differences in predicted expenses between low-risk and
high-risk individuals. Figure 3 for scenario I confirms that
only without any risk equalization the premium could
decrease with the number of consecutive years insured
have opted for a deductible. Figure 4 for scenario II shows
that the premium could only decrease for the second con-
secutive year insured have opted for a voluntary deductible
in case of perfect or sophisticated (i.e., 74 %) risk equal-
ization. But thereafter, the premium would substantially
increase with the number of consecutive years insured have
opted for a deductible. Furthermore, the premium could
Table 2 Ex-ante option.
Composition of the premium for
an insurance policy with a
differentiation of the premium
to the duration of the contract
period for a voluntary
deductible of €1000 in year
t without any risk equalization
% HCE ICa MHR OOP P
a
50 NVD €1894 €3289 €3289
50 VD €128 €113 €257 €128
10 VD 1-year contract €573 €360 €656 €573
10 VD 2-year contract €35 €87 €262 €35
10 VD 3-year contract €19 €56 €173 €19
10 VD 4-year contract €12 €39 €123 €12
10 VD 5-year contract €1 €22 €72 €1
HCE, average healthcare expenses; IC, average insurance claims; MHR, average moral hazard reduction;
OOP, average out-of-pocket expenses; P, premium; NVD, insured without a voluntary deductible; VD,
insured with a voluntary deductible
a Note that since a situation without risk equalization is shown, no risk equalization payment is in place and
the insurance claims equal the premium
Table 3 Ex-post option. Composition of the premium for an insur-
ance policy with a differentiation of the premium to the number of
previous consecutive years an insured has opted for a voluntary
deductible of €1000 in year t without any risk equalization
% HCE ICa MHR OOP P
a
SCENARIO I: no behavioral effect
50 NVD €1894 €3287 €3287
50 VD €133 €113 €254 €133
9.1 1 VD €238 €181 €381 €238
6.0 2 VD €192 €152 €327 €192
4.7 3 VD €141 €126 €291 €141
3.5 4 VD €120 €114 €268 €120
26.7 5 VD €85 €79 €186 €85
SCENARIO II: moderate behavioral effect
40.9 NVD €1894 €3584 €3584
59.0 VD €262 €163 €296 €262
4.6 1 VD €287 €208 €423 €287
4.6 2 VD €502 €281 €457 €502
3.5 3 VD €349 €219 €400 €349
6.4 4 VD €332 €200 €350 €332
39.9 5 VD €213 €134 €245 €213
HCE, average healthcare expenses; IC, average insurance claims;
MHR, average moral hazard reduction; OOP, average out-of-pocket
expenses; P, premium; NVD, insured without a voluntary deductible;
VD, insured with a voluntary deductible (the number corresponds to
the number of consecutive years)
a Note that since a situation without risk equalization is shown, no
risk equalization payment is in place and the insurance claims equal
the premium
Table 4 Ex-ante option. Composition of the premium for an insur-
ance policy with a differentiation of the premium to the duration of
the contract period for a voluntary deductible of €1000 in year t with
perfect risk equalization
% IC REP P
50 NVD €3289 €-1395 €1894
50 VD €128 €1396 €1524
10 VD 1 year contract €573 €305 €878
10 VD 2 year contract €35 €1510 €1545
10 VD 3 year contract €19 €1646 €1665
10 VD 4 year contract €12 €1720 €1732
10 VD 5 year contract €1 €1799 €1800
IC, average insurance claims; REP, risk equalization payment,
determined according to Eq. (2a) or (2b) given the MHR and OOP
shown in Table 2; P, premium; NVD, insured without a voluntary
deductible; VD, insured with a voluntary deductible
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Fig. 2 Difference in premium (P) compared to a 1-year contract for
the voluntary deductible (VD) for risk equalization models that
equalize either 0, 47, 74, or 100 % of the difference in predicted
expenses between low-risk and high-risk individuals where the
distribution of insured in year t (i.e., 2007) is determined according to
the ex-ante differentiation of the premium
Table 5 Ex-post option. Composition of the premium for an insurance policy with a differentiation of the premium to the number of previous
consecutive years an insured has opted for a voluntary deductible of €1000 in year t with perfect risk equalization
% IC REP P
SCENARIO I: no behavioral effect
50 NVD €3287 €-1393 €1894
50 VD €133 €1394 €1507
9.1 1 VD €238 €1094 €1299
6 2 VD €192 €1223 €1389
4.7 3 VD €141 €1336 €1456
3.5 4 VD €120 €1392 €1495
26.7 5 VD €85 €1544 €1617
SCENARIO II: moderate behavioral effect
40.9 NVD €3584 €-1690 €1894
59 VD €262 €1173 €1435
4.6 1 VD €287 €976 €1263
4.6 2 VD €502 €654 €1156
3.5 3 VD €349 €926 €1275
6.4 4 VD €332 €1012 €1344
39.9 5 VD €213 €1302 €1515
IC, average insurance claims; REP, risk equalization payment, determined according to Eq. (2a) or (2b) given the MHR and OOP shown in
Table 3; P, premium; NVD, insured without a voluntary deductible; VD, insured with a voluntary deductible (the number corresponds to the
number of consecutive years)
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Fig. 3 Difference in premium (P) compared to 1 year opting for a
voluntary deductible (VD) for risk equalization models that equalize
either 0, 47, 74, or 100 % of the difference in predicted expenses
between low-risk and high-risk individuals where the distribution of
insured in year t (i.e., 2011) is determined according to the ex-post
differentiation of the premium for scenario I (no behavioral effect)
Fig. 4 Difference in premium (P) compared to 1 year opting for a
voluntary deductible (VD) for risk equalization models that equalize
either 0, 47, 74, or 100 % of the difference in predicted expenses
between low-risk and high-risk individuals where the distribution of
insured in year t (i.e., 2011) is determined according to the ex-post
differentiation of the premium for scenario II (moderate behavioral
effect)
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only decrease from the second consecutive year insured
have opted for a deductible in a situation without risk
equalization. It might therefore not be that surprising that
none of the Dutch insurers utilizes the option to ex-post
differentiated the premium. Overall, under the assumptions
made within this paper, these results imply that, due to risk
equalization, it does not seem likely that insurers in Ger-
many, Switzerland, the Netherlands, or the US could offer
a decreasing premium if it is either differentiated to the
duration of the contract for which the voluntary deductible
holds or the number of previous consecutive years insured
have opted for a voluntary deductible.
Conclusions
Voluntary deductibles are implemented in regulated
insurance markets such as Germany, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, and the US to counteract moral hazard.
However, the moral hazard reduction resulting from these
deductibles could be mitigated by adverse selection, since
insured only opt for a deductible if their expected out-of-
pocket expenses under the deductible are smaller than the
premium rebate. Insurers in regulated markets may reduce
this adverse selection by differentiating the premium
according to either the duration of the contract for which
the voluntary deductible holds (ex-ante approach) or the
number of previous years insured have opted for a vol-
untary deductible (ex-post approach). It can be hypothe-
sized that, the longer the period for which the voluntary
deductible holds or the more previous years an insured
has opted for a voluntary deductible, the lower the pre-
mium will be. This would incentivize insured to opt for a
voluntary deductible for a longer period or for another
consecutive year. To determine the premiums that could
be offered in case of such differentiations, we simulated
the distribution of insured over the deductible options for
both the ex-ante and ex-post differentiation. Thereafter,
we calculated the premiums based upon the insurance
claims and a risk equalization payment. The results show
that only without risk equalization insurers would be able
to offer a decreasing premium with the duration of the
contract or with the number of previous consecutive years
insured have opted for a voluntary deductible. With
moderate, sophisticated, or perfect risk equalization, the
premiums are expected to increase for both the ex-ante
and ex-post differentiation. These results are due to the
fact that as either the duration of the contract or the
number of years insured have opted for a voluntary
deductible increases, the insurance claims decrease but
the risk equalization payments increase, which overall
increases the premium. In sum, under the assumptions
made in this paper, the results imply that, due to risk
equalization, it seems unlikely that insurers in Germany,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, or the US can offer
premiums that decrease with either the duration of the
contract for which the voluntary deductible holds or the
number of previous consecutive years insured have opted
for a voluntary deductible. Given these findings, we are
sceptical about the feasibility of these strategies to
counteract adverse selection.
Discussion
General discussion points
This section provides four general discussion points
regarding the representativeness of our data, the sample
sizes of the groups under study, the way risk equal-
ization is taken into account and the omission of the
loading fee in our analyses. Firstly, as mentioned when
discussing the data, the average health in the sample is
somewhat worse compared to the Dutch population.
This implies that the absolute premiums presented in
this paper are probably higher than they would be in the
Dutch population. The effect of this limitation on rel-
ative premiums (i.e., the increase or decrease of the
premium with the duration of the contract period or the
number of previous consecutive years opting for a
voluntary deductible) and our conclusions, however,
will be minor since deductible choice is simulated
relative to spending and characteristics in our sample
and not relative to an absolute benchmark. Furthermore,
it seems most likely that if insurers would want to
differentiate the premiums for their health insurance
policies, they would use their own data to determine
these premiums. Nevertheless, we emphasize that our
absolute results are not generalizable to the entire
(Dutch) population. In order to achieve more general-
izable results, a more representative dataset would be
necessary.
Secondly, some of the groups resulting from our simu-
lations are quite small (e.g., 3.5 % of the sample) and the
results of these groups could be affected by a few insured
in the data with very large insurance claims. However, only
176 insured (i.e., 0.02 %) and 17 insured (i.e., 0.002 %) in
the data had healthcare expenses, respectively, larger than
€100,000 or €200,000 in 2011. Sensitivity checks where
these insured are omitted show that the absolute premiums
change only marginally and that the relative premiums
remain unchanged.
Thirdly, contrary to our analyses, cost reductions
resulting from the voluntary deductible (i.e., moral hazard
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reduction and out-of-pocket expenses) are in Switzerland,
Germany, and the Netherlands partially captured by risk
equalization and can consequently not be fully reflected
into the premium rebate [36]. This implies that the pre-
mium for insured with a deductible would be higher
compared to our paper, but it does not affect the relative
premiums found in this paper.
Fourthly, this paper only studied insurance claims and
disregarded the insurer’s loading fee. Although the loading
fee does not constitute a large part of the premium, it could
affect the premium, the premium rebate and risk equal-
ization if the average loading fee differs between insured
with and without a voluntary deductible. For instance,
administration costs differ between these groups since
insured with a deductible do not send their bills to the
insurer before the total amount exceeds the deductible.
Consequently, the insurer does not have to handle the bills
of these insured [34]. Even in a system where most bills are
settled between the insurer and the provider, such as in the
Netherlands, a difference in administration costs between
insured who do and do not opt for a deductible can exist.
One can hypothesize that, since upcoding is a serious
problem [29], insurers spend a lot of time verifying the
received bills. Since insured with a voluntary deductible on
average use less healthcare services and therefore file less
bills compared to insured without a deductible, it could be
assumed that verifying the bills of the latter group is more
expensive. In a market without any (or with poor) risk
equalization, this could imply that the premiums could
potentially decrease for insured with a voluntary deductible
compared to the simulations showed within this paper due
to smaller administrative costs. However, further research
regarding the effect of the loading fee on the premium—
also in case of an ex-ante or ex-post differentiation—is
necessary.
Empirical assumptions
This section provides five discussion points regarding the
assumptions in our empirical simulations. Firstly, we based
the assumption of which insured opt for a voluntary
deductible solely on the predicted healthcare expenses.
However, research shows that other determinants than the
predicted expenses affect the decision to opt for a deduc-
tible as well, such as loss aversion, risk attitude, ambiguity
aversion, debt aversion and omission bias [38]. As a result
of these factors, it could be expected that fewer insured
(i.e., less than 50 %) opt for a voluntary deductible. As
shown in Table 1, fewer insured opting for a deductible
affects the absolute premium, but sensitivity analyses
showed that the relative premiums for both the ex-ante and
ex-post differentiation would not be affected.
Secondly, since we simulate who opts for a deductible
based upon predicted expenses, we are unable to incorpo-
rate planned medical decisions not identified by the
explanatory variables used in our estimation models, such
as pregnancy. In our simulations, insured with unidentified
planned medical decisions might opt for a deductible,
while in practice they would not due to (high) expected
healthcare expenses. We therefore may underestimate
adverse selection into the different deductible options.
Thirdly, we do not study expenses for different types of
healthcare services, but only use total healthcare expenses.
Gerfin et al. [13] show that deductibles affect different
types of healthcare differently, where the decrease in
healthcare expenses due to the deductible is most pro-
nounced for inpatient care and prescription drugs. This
could impact the insured’s decision to opt for a voluntary
deductible, which is not taken into account in our analyses.
Fourthly, we assume very strong adverse selection into
the different deductible options: the entire half of the
sample with the lowest predicted expenses opts for a
voluntary deductible. A sensitivity check for scenario I of
the ex-post differentiation shows that if this assumption is
relaxed (i.e., one in two insured belonging to the half of
the sample with the lowest predicted expenses randomly
opts for a deductible in year t), the premiums still
increase with the number of consecutive years insured
have opted for a voluntary deductible in case of perfect
risk equalization.
Fifthly, for the ex-ante differentiation, we determine the
rank of insured in the upcoming years using information
from these years. It might, however, be questionable how
much information insured actually have on future expen-
ses. Therefore, we performed a sensitivity check for the ex-
ante differentiation using only the information known at
the start of year t to rank insured (see the results in ‘‘Ap-
pendix 3’’). This approach implies an underestimation of
adverse selection, since research shows that insured do
have some information on future healthcare expenses [32].
The sensitivity check shows that, although the absolute
premiums are somewhat different, the relative premiums
show the same pattern as with the approach used within
this paper: without risk equalization, the premiums
decrease with the duration of the contract period and with
risk equalization, the premiums increase with the duration
of the contract period.
Market dynamics
Our results show the first-order effects (i.e., the premiums
when starting to offer insurance policies with ex-ante or ex-
post differentiated premiums) and disregard any market
dynamics. This section elaborates on these market
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dynamics for markets without risk equalization since the
results already showed that ex-ante or ex-post differenti-
ated decreasing premiums are impossible with sophisti-
cated or perfect risk equalization.
Regarding the ex-ante differentiation, if insurer ‘A’, for
instance, would offer these six health insurance policies,
insured would have a large incentive to opt for a policy
with a contract period longer than 1 year due to the
decreasing premium. However, if a competitor would not
offer differentiated premiums, his premium for a policy
with a voluntary deductible would be much lower (i.e.,
€128 compared to €573; see Table 2). If insurer ‘A’ would
be able, due to optimal marketing, to attract the healthiest
insured away from his competitor into the long contract
policies, it might indeed be attractive to offer ex-ante dif-
ferentiated premiums. The reason is that in that case, his
competitor has set the premium for a policy with a vol-
untary deductible too low and must increase it. Addition-
ally, since the results only show the first-order effects, the
estimated premiums could change over time when the
contract expires and insured once again get to choose
between the different deductible options. As with the ex-
post approach, it could be that insured are willing to accept
(high) healthcare expenses during 1 year of their contract
period. Further research into this dynamic behavioral effect
for insurance markets without risk equalization would be
necessary to provide insights into the resulting premium
patterns.
Regarding the ex-post differentiation, scenario I
(Table 3) especially shows the first-order effects. In that
case, insurer ‘B’, for instance, could offer these six health
insurance policies, but he could also decide to combine two
or three insurance policies. Note that, as with the ex-ante
differentiation, a competitor of insurer ‘B’ who might not
offer differentiated premiums, might be less expensive than
insurer ‘B’. Again, in that case, insurer ‘B’ should try to
attract the healthiest insured away from his competitors
into the policies for insured who opted for a deductible in
more consecutive years. From scenario I, scenario II could
be interpreted as the situation after 5 years (i.e., year t ? 5)
with some market dynamics simulated as a moderate
behavioral effect of the decreasing premium on the insur-
ed’s decision to opt for a deductible. It already shows that
decreasing premiums could only be offered upward of two
consecutive years, but further research into market
dynamics and behavioral effects in insurance markets
without risk equalization would be necessary to provide
further insight into the resulting premium patterns.
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Appendix 1: Several models to estimate
the predicted healthcare expenses and accordingly
rank insured
Several models are tested to determine the predicted
healthcare expenses of individuals in year t based upon
their background characteristics.
1. Ordinary least squares
2. Ordinary least squares with a log transformation of
healthcare expenses
3. Generalized linear model with a gamma distribution
and a log link
4. Generalized linear model with a gamma distribution
and a power -1 link
5. Generalized linear model with a gamma distribution
and a power 0.5 link
6. Generalized linear model with a normal distribution
and a log link.
Table 6 shows the Spearman correlation coefficients of
the predicted healthcare expenses with the actual health-
care expenses in year t for all models. Table 6 shows these
correlation coefficients for both the entire dataset and a
subset of the sample. This subset regards the half of insured
with the lowest actual healthcare expenses in year t. We
also determined the correlation coefficient for this subset to
see whether our preferred model would also perform well
for the healthiest insured since these would be the insured
we would select to opt for a voluntary deductible. Since the
second model, the OLS with a log transformation of
healthcare expenses, has the highest correlation coefficient
on both the entire dataset and the subset of the sample, this
model is used to determine the predicted healthcare
expenses of all insured in year t and rank insured
accordingly.
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Appendix 2: Independent variables included
in statistical model
Table 7 provides a description of the independent variables
that are included in the model. The six models mentioned
in ‘‘Appendix 1’’ were also tested with the same indepen-
dent variables as mentioned in Table 7 but with the past
total healthcare expenses in year t - 1 included as a con-
tinuous variable (instead of included as dummy variables
for the vigintiles). However, with this operationalization of
the past total healthcare expenses, the correlation coeffi-
cients were much lower (e.g., the correlation coefficient for
the second model was 0.6480).
Appendix 3: Sensitivity check on the rank
of insured for the ex-ante differentiation
See Tables 8 and 9.
Table 6 Spearman correlation coefficient of the predicted healthcare
expenses according to the different models with the actual healthcare
expenses in year t for the entire dataset and for the half of insured
with the lowest actual healthcare expenses
Entire dataset Subset of sample
0 Actual healthcare expenses in year t 1.0000 1.0000
1 OLS 0.6857 0.3814
2 OLS with log transformation of THCE 0.7384 0.5192
3 GLM with gamma distribution and log link 0.7327 0.5021
4 GLM with gamma distribution and power -1 link 0.5928 0.4730
5 GLM with gamma distribution and power 0.5 link 0.7326 0.5010
6 GLM with normal distribution and log link 0.6947 0.4356
THCE, total healthcare expenses under basic insurance
Table 7 Description of the independent variables of the model to determine the predicted healthcare expenses in year t
Independent
variables
Description Number of variables in
the model
Age/gender 28 Classes (i.e., 14 classes for males and 14 classes for females) with age in 5-year classes starting
from 18–24 years up to an age of 84. Insured older than 84 years are also included in a separate
risk class.
27a
PCG 1 Class to indicate whether an insured is classified into a PCG in year t. Individuals are assigned to
a PCG when they used at least 180 daily dosages of a specific drug in year t - 1.
1
DCG 1 Class to indicate whether an insured is classified into a DCG in year t. Individuals are assigned to
a DCG when they had a hospital admission in year t - 1 for a specific diagnosis.
1
Urbanization 5 Classes to indicate the degree of urbanization in the insured’s residential area based upon a four
digit zip code
4a
Ethnicity 1 Class to indicate whether the insured is native or non-native. Non-native insured include insured
with a Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese descent.
1
Past healthcare
expenses
20 Classes that indicate the vigintile of total healthcare expenses under basic insurance the insured
incurred in year t - 1.
19a
a The number of variables included in the model is for some independent variables one less than the number of defined classes, because one
variable for each independent variable is a reference group for all included dummy variables per independent variable
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